Various Works Page 53

  taken a new term, being so far without knowledge that A belongs to

  C. Or again suppose that the terms intermediate between B and C are

  few: for thus too we are nearer knowledge. For example let D stand for

  squaring, E for rectilinear figure, F for circle. If there were only

  one term intermediate between E and F (viz. that the circle is made

  equal to a rectilinear figure by the help of lunules), we should be

  near to knowledge. But when BC is not more probable than AC, and the

  intermediate terms are not few, I do not call this reduction: nor

  again when the statement BC is immediate: for such a statement is

  knowledge.

  26

  An objection is a premiss contrary to a premiss. It differs from a

  premiss, because it may be particular, but a premiss either cannot

  be particular at all or not in universal syllogisms. An objection is

  brought in two ways and through two figures; in two ways because every

  objection is either universal or particular, by two figures because

  objections are brought in opposition to the premiss, and opposites can

  be proved only in the first and third figures. If a man maintains a

  universal affirmative, we reply with a universal or a particular

  negative; the former is proved from the first figure, the latter

  from the third. For example let stand for there being a single

  science, B for contraries. If a man premises that contraries are

  subjects of a single science, the objection may be either that

  opposites are never subjects of a single science, and contraries are

  opposites, so that we get the first figure, or that the knowable and

  the unknowable are not subjects of a single science: this proof is

  in the third figure: for it is true of C (the knowable and the

  unknowable) that they are contraries, and it is false that they are

  the subjects of a single science.

  Similarly if the premiss objected to is negative. For if a man

  maintains that contraries are not subjects of a single science, we

  reply either that all opposites or that certain contraries, e.g.

  what is healthy and what is sickly, are subjects of the same

  science: the former argument issues from the first, the latter from

  the third figure.

  In general if a man urges a universal objection he must frame his

  contradiction with reference to the universal of the terms taken by

  his opponent, e.g. if a man maintains that contraries are not subjects

  of the same science, his opponent must reply that there is a single

  science of all opposites. Thus we must have the first figure: for

  the term which embraces the original subject becomes the middle term.

  If the objection is particular, the objector must frame his

  contradiction with reference to a term relatively to which the subject

  of his opponent's premiss is universal, e.g. he will point out that

  the knowable and the unknowable are not subjects of the same

  science: 'contraries' is universal relatively to these. And we have

  the third figure: for the particular term assumed is middle, e.g.

  the knowable and the unknowable. Premisses from which it is possible

  to draw the contrary conclusion are what we start from when we try

  to make objections. Consequently we bring objections in these

  figures only: for in them only are opposite syllogisms possible, since

  the second figure cannot produce an affirmative conclusion.

  Besides, an objection in the middle figure would require a fuller

  argument, e.g. if it should not be granted that A belongs to B,

  because C does not follow B. This can be made clear only by other

  premisses. But an objection ought not to turn off into other things,

  but have its new premiss quite clear immediately. For this reason also

  this is the only figure from which proof by signs cannot be obtained.

  We must consider later the other kinds of objection, namely the

  objection from contraries, from similars, and from common opinion, and

  inquire whether a particular objection cannot be elicited from the

  first figure or a negative objection from the second.

  27

  A probability and a sign are not identical, but a probability is a

  generally approved proposition: what men know to happen or not to

  happen, to be or not to be, for the most part thus and thus, is a

  probability, e.g. 'the envious hate', 'the beloved show affection'.

  A sign means a demonstrative proposition necessary or generally

  approved: for anything such that when it is another thing is, or

  when it has come into being the other has come into being before or

  after, is a sign of the other's being or having come into being. Now

  an enthymeme is a syllogism starting from probabilities or signs,

  and a sign may be taken in three ways, corresponding to the position

  of the middle term in the figures. For it may be taken as in the first

  figure or the second or the third. For example the proof that a

  woman is with child because she has milk is in the first figure: for

  to have milk is the middle term. Let A represent to be with child, B

  to have milk, C woman. The proof that wise men are good, since

  Pittacus is good, comes through the last figure. Let A stand for good,

  B for wise men, C for Pittacus. It is true then to affirm both A and B

  of C: only men do not say the latter, because they know it, though

  they state the former. The proof that a woman is with child because

  she is pale is meant to come through the middle figure: for since

  paleness follows women with child and is a concomitant of this

  woman, people suppose it has been proved that she is with child. Let A

  stand for paleness, B for being with child, C for woman. Now if the

  one proposition is stated, we have only a sign, but if the other is

  stated as well, a syllogism, e.g. 'Pittacus is generous, since

  ambitious men are generous and Pittacus is ambitious.' Or again

  'Wise men are good, since Pittacus is not only good but wise.' In this

  way then syllogisms are formed, only that which proceeds through the

  first figure is irrefutable if it is true (for it is universal),

  that which proceeds through the last figure is refutable even if the

  conclusion is true, since the syllogism is not universal nor

  correlative to the matter in question: for though Pittacus is good, it

  is not therefore necessary that all other wise men should be good. But

  the syllogism which proceeds through the middle figure is always

  refutable in any case: for a syllogism can never be formed when the

  terms are related in this way: for though a woman with child is

  pale, and this woman also is pale, it is not necessary that she should

  be with child. Truth then may be found in signs whatever their kind,

  but they have the differences we have stated.

  We must either divide signs in the way stated, and among them

  designate the middle term as the index (for people call that the index

  which makes us know, and the middle term above all has this

  character), or else we must call the arguments derived from the

  extremes signs, that derived from the middle term the index: for

  that which is proved through the first figure is most generally

  a
ccepted and most true.

  It is possible to infer character from features, if it is granted

  that the body and the soul are changed together by the natural

  affections: I say 'natural', for though perhaps by learning music a

  man has made some change in his soul, this is not one of those

  affections which are natural to us; rather I refer to passions and

  desires when I speak of natural emotions. If then this were granted

  and also that for each change there is a corresponding sign, and we

  could state the affection and sign proper to each kind of animal, we

  shall be able to infer character from features. For if there is an

  affection which belongs properly to an individual kind, e.g. courage

  to lions, it is necessary that there should be a sign of it: for ex

  hypothesi body and soul are affected together. Suppose this sign is

  the possession of large extremities: this may belong to other kinds

  also though not universally. For the sign is proper in the sense

  stated, because the affection is proper to the whole kind, though

  not proper to it alone, according to our usual manner of speaking. The

  same thing then will be found in another kind, and man may be brave,

  and some other kinds of animal as well. They will then have the

  sign: for ex hypothesi there is one sign corresponding to each

  affection. If then this is so, and we can collect signs of this sort

  in these animals which have only one affection proper to them-but each

  affection has its sign, since it is necessary that it should have a

  single sign-we shall then be able to infer character from features.

  But if the kind as a whole has two properties, e.g. if the lion is

  both brave and generous, how shall we know which of the signs which

  are its proper concomitants is the sign of a particular affection?

  Perhaps if both belong to some other kind though not to the whole of

  it, and if, in those kinds in which each is found though not in the

  whole of their members, some members possess one of the affections and

  not the other: e.g. if a man is brave but not generous, but possesses,

  of the two signs, large extremities, it is clear that this is the sign

  of courage in the lion also. To judge character from features, then,

  is possible in the first figure if the middle term is convertible with

  the first extreme, but is wider than the third term and not

  convertible with it: e.g. let A stand for courage, B for large

  extremities, and C for lion. B then belongs to everything to which C

  belongs, but also to others. But A belongs to everything to which B

  belongs, and to nothing besides, but is convertible with B: otherwise,

  there would not be a single sign correlative with each affection.

  -THE END-

  .

  350 BC

  ON PROPHESYING BY DREAMS

  by Aristotle

  translated by J. I. Beare

  1

  As to the divination which takes place in sleep, and is said to be

  based on dreams, we cannot lightly either dismiss it with contempt

  or give it implicit confidence. The fact that all persons, or many,

  suppose dreams to possess a special significance, tends to inspire

  us with belief in it [such divination], as founded on the testimony of

  experience; and indeed that divination in dreams should, as regards

  some subjects, be genuine, is not incredible, for it has a show of

  reason; from which one might form a like opinion also respecting all

  other dreams. Yet the fact of our seeing no probable cause to

  account for such divination tends to inspire us with distrust. For, in

  addition to its further unreasonableness, it is absurd to combine

  the idea that the sender of such dreams should be God with the fact

  that those to whom he sends them are not the best and wisest, but

  merely commonplace persons. If, however, we abstract from the

  causality of God, none of the other causes assigned appears

  probable. For that certain persons should have foresight in dreams

  concerning things destined to take place at the Pillars of Hercules,

  or on the banks of the Borysthenes, seems to be something to

  discover the explanation of which surpasses the wit of man. Well then,

  the dreams in question must be regarded either as causes, or as

  tokens, of the events, or else as coincidences; either as all, or

  some, of these, or as one only. I use the word 'cause' in the sense in

  which the moon is [the cause] of an eclipse of the sun, or in which

  fatigue is [a cause] of fever; 'token' [in the sense in which] the

  entrance of a star [into the shadow] is a token of the eclipse, or [in

  which] roughness of the tongue [is a token] of fever; while by

  'coincidence' I mean, for example, the occurrence of an eclipse of the

  sun while some one is taking a walk; for the walking is neither a

  token nor a cause of the eclipse, nor the eclipse [a cause or token]

  of the walking. For this reason no coincidence takes place according

  to a universal or general rule. Are we then to say that some dreams

  are causes, others tokens, e.g. of events taking place in the bodily

  organism? At all events, even scientific physicians tell us that one

  should pay diligent attention to dreams, and to hold this view is

  reasonable also for those who are not practitioners, but speculative

  philosophers. For the movements which occur in the daytime [within the

  body] are, unless very great and violent, lost sight of in contrast

  with the waking movements, which are more impressive. In sleep the

  opposite takes place, for then even trifling movements seem

  considerable. This is plain in what often happens during sleep; for

  example, dreamers fancy that they are affected by thunder and

  lightning, when in fact there are only faint ringings in their ears;

  or that they are enjoying honey or other sweet savours, when only a

  tiny drop of phlegm is flowing down [the oesophagus]; or that they are

  walking through fire, and feeling intense heat, when there is only a

  slight warmth affecting certain parts of the body. When they are

  awakened, these things appear to them in this their true character.

  But since the beginnings of all events are small, so, it is clear, are

  those also of the diseases or other affections about to occur in our

  bodies. In conclusion, it is manifest that these beginnings must be

  more evident in sleeping than in waking moments.

  Nay, indeed, it is not improbable that some of the presentations

  which come before the mind in sleep may even be causes of the

  actions cognate to each of them. For as when we are about to act [in

  waking hours], or are engaged in any course of action, or have already

  performed certain actions, we often find ourselves concerned with

  these actions, or performing them, in a vivid dream; the cause whereof

  is that the dream-movement has had a way paved for it from the

  original movements set up in the daytime; exactly so, but

  conversely, it must happen that the movements set up first in sleep

  should also prove to be starting-points of actions to be performed

  in the daytime, since the recurrence by day of the thought of these

  actions also has had its way paved for it
in the images before the

  mind at night. Thus then it is quite conceivable that some dreams

  may be tokens and causes [of future events].

  Most [so-called prophetic] dreams are, however, to be classed as

  mere coincidences, especially all such as are extravagant, and those

  in the fulfilment of which the dreamers have no initiative, such as in

  the case of a sea-fight, or of things taking place far away. As

  regards these it is natural that the fact should stand as it does

  whenever a person, on mentioning something, finds the very thing

  mentioned come to pass. Why, indeed, should this not happen also in

  sleep? The probability is, rather, that many such things should

  happen. As, then, one's mentioning a particular person is neither

  token nor cause of this person's presenting himself, so, in the

  parallel instance, the dream is, to him who has seen it, neither token

  nor cause of its [so-called] fulfilment, but a mere coincidence. Hence

  the fact that many dreams have no 'fulfilment', for coincidence do not

  occur according to any universal or general law.

  2

  On the whole, forasmuch as certain of the lower animals also

  dream, it may be concluded that dreams are not sent by God, nor are

  they designed for this purpose [to reveal the future]. They have a

  divine aspect, however, for Nature [their cause] is divinely

  planned, though not itself divine. A special proof [of their not being

  sent by God] is this: the power of foreseeing the future and of having

  vivid dreams is found in persons of inferior type, which implies

  that God does not send their dreams; but merely that all those whose

  physical temperament is, as it were, garrulous and excitable, see

  sights of all descriptions; for, inasmuch as they experience many

  movements of every kind, they just chance to have visions resembling

  objective facts, their luck in these matters being merely like that of

  persons who play at even and odd. For the principle which is expressed

  in the gambler's maxim: 'If you make many throws your luck must