Various Works Page 15

  But the 'now' corresponds to the body that is carried along, as time

  corresponds to the motion. For it is by means of the body that is

  carried along that we become aware of the 'before and after' the

  motion, and if we regard these as countable we get the 'now'. Hence in

  these also the 'now' as substratum remains the same (for it is what is

  before and after in movement), but what is predicated of it is

  different; for it is in so far as the 'before and after' is

  numerable that we get the 'now'. This is what is most knowable: for,

  similarly, motion is known because of that which is moved,

  locomotion because of that which is carried. what is carried is a real

  thing, the movement is not. Thus what is called 'now' in one sense

  is always the same; in another it is not the same: for this is true

  also of what is carried.

  Clearly, too, if there were no time, there would be no 'now', and

  vice versa. just as the moving body and its locomotion involve each

  other mutually, so too do the number of the moving body and the number

  of its locomotion. For the number of the locomotion is time, while the

  'now' corresponds to the moving body, and is like the unit of number.

  Time, then, also is both made continuous by the 'now' and divided at

  it. For here too there is a correspondence with the locomotion and the

  moving body. For the motion or locomotion is made one by the thing

  which is moved, because it is one-not because it is one in its own

  nature (for there might be pauses in the movement of such a thing)-but

  because it is one in definition: for this determines the movement as

  'before' and 'after'. Here, too there is a correspondence with the

  point; for the point also both connects and terminates the length-it

  is the beginning of one and the end of another. But when you take it

  in this way, using the one point as two, a pause is necessary, if

  the same point is to be the beginning and the end. The 'now' on the

  other hand, since the body carried is moving, is always different.

  Hence time is not number in the sense in which there is 'number'

  of the same point because it is beginning and end, but rather as the

  extremities of a line form a number, and not as the parts of the

  line do so, both for the reason given (for we can use the middle point

  as two, so that on that analogy time might stand still), and further

  because obviously the 'now' is no part of time nor the section any

  part of the movement, any more than the points are parts of the

  line-for it is two lines that are parts of one line.

  In so far then as the 'now' is a boundary, it is not time, but an

  attribute of it; in so far as it numbers, it is number; for boundaries

  belong only to that which they bound, but number (e.g. ten) is the

  number of these horses, and belongs also elsewhere.

  It is clear, then, that time is 'number of movement in respect of

  the before and after', and is continuous since it is an attribute of

  what is continuous.

  12

  The smallest number, in the strict sense of the word 'number', is

  two. But of number as concrete, sometimes there is a minimum,

  sometimes not: e.g. of a 'line', the smallest in respect of

  multiplicity is two (or, if you like, one), but in respect of size

  there is no minimum; for every line is divided ad infinitum. Hence

  it is so with time. In respect of number the minimum is one (or

  two); in point of extent there is no minimum.

  It is clear, too, that time is not described as fast or slow, but as

  many or few and as long or short. For as continuous it is long or

  short and as a number many or few, but it is not fast or slow-any more

  than any number with which we number is fast or slow.

  Further, there is the same time everywhere at once, but not the same

  time before and after, for while the present change is one, the change

  which has happened and that which will happen are different. Time is

  not number with which we count, but the number of things which are

  counted, and this according as it occurs before or after is always

  different, for the 'nows' are different. And the number of a hundred

  horses and a hundred men is the same, but the things numbered are

  different-the horses from the men. Further, as a movement can be one

  and the same again and again, so too can time, e.g. a year or a spring

  or an autumn.

  Not only do we measure the movement by the time, but also the time

  by the movement, because they define each other. The time marks the

  movement, since it is its number, and the movement the time. We

  describe the time as much or little, measuring it by the movement,

  just as we know the number by what is numbered, e.g. the number of the

  horses by one horse as the unit. For we know how many horses there are

  by the use of the number; and again by using the one horse as unit

  we know the number of the horses itself. So it is with the time and

  the movement; for we measure the movement by the time and vice

  versa. It is natural that this should happen; for the movement goes

  with the distance and the time with the movement, because they are

  quanta and continuous and divisible. The movement has these attributes

  because the distance is of this nature, and the time has them

  because of the movement. And we measure both the distance by the

  movement and the movement by the distance; for we say that the road is

  long, if the journey is long, and that this is long, if the road is

  long-the time, too, if the movement, and the movement, if the time.

  Time is a measure of motion and of being moved, and it measures

  the motion by determining a motion which will measure exactly the

  whole motion, as the cubit does the length by determining an amount

  which will measure out the whole. Further 'to be in time' means for

  movement, that both it and its essence are measured by time (for

  simultaneously it measures both the movement and its essence, and this

  is what being in time means for it, that its essence should be

  measured).

  Clearly then 'to be in time' has the same meaning for other things

  also, namely, that their being should be measured by time. 'To be in

  time' is one of two things: (1) to exist when time exists, (2) as we

  say of some things that they are 'in number'. The latter means

  either what is a part or mode of number-in general, something which

  belongs to number-or that things have a number.

  Now, since time is number, the 'now' and the 'before' and the like

  are in time, just as 'unit' and 'odd' and 'even' are in number, i.e.

  in the sense that the one set belongs to number, the other to time.

  But things are in time as they are in number. If this is so, they

  are contained by time as things in place are contained by place.

  Plainly, too, to be in time does not mean to co-exist with time, any

  more than to be in motion or in place means to co-exist with motion or

  place. For if 'to be in something' is to mean this, then all things

  will be in anything, and the heaven will be in a grain; for when the

  grain is, then also is the heaven. But this is a merely incidental


  conjunction, whereas the other is necessarily involved: that which

  is in time necessarily involves that there is time when it is, and

  that which is in motion that there is motion when it is.

  Since what is 'in time' is so in the same sense as what is in number

  is so, a time greater than everything in time can be found. So it is

  necessary that all the things in time should be contained by time,

  just like other things also which are 'in anything', e.g. the things

  'in place' by place.

  A thing, then, will be affected by time, just as we are accustomed

  to say that time wastes things away, and that all things grow old

  through time, and that there is oblivion owing to the lapse of time,

  but we do not say the same of getting to know or of becoming young

  or fair. For time is by its nature the cause rather of decay, since it

  is the number of change, and change removes what is.

  Hence, plainly, things which are always are not, as such, in time,

  for they are not contained time, nor is their being measured by

  time. A proof of this is that none of them is affected by time,

  which indicates that they are not in time.

  Since time is the measure of motion, it will be the measure of

  rest too-indirectly. For all rest is in time. For it does not follow

  that what is in time is moved, though what is in motion is necessarily

  moved. For time is not motion, but 'number of motion': and what is

  at rest, also, can be in the number of motion. Not everything that

  is not in motion can be said to be 'at rest'-but only that which can

  be moved, though it actually is not moved, as was said above.

  'To be in number' means that there is a number of the thing, and

  that its being is measured by the number in which it is. Hence if a

  thing is 'in time' it will be measured by time. But time will

  measure what is moved and what is at rest, the one qua moved, the

  other qua at rest; for it will measure their motion and rest

  respectively.

  Hence what is moved will not be measurable by the time simply in

  so far as it has quantity, but in so far as its motion has quantity.

  Thus none of the things which are neither moved nor at rest are in

  time: for 'to be in time' is 'to be measured by time', while time is

  the measure of motion and rest.

  Plainly, then, neither will everything that does not exist be in

  time, i.e. those non-existent things that cannot exist, as the

  diagonal cannot be commensurate with the side.

  Generally, if time is directly the measure of motion and

  indirectly of other things, it is clear that a thing whose existence

  is measured by it will have its existence in rest or motion. Those

  things therefore which are subject to perishing and

  becoming-generally, those which at one time exist, at another do

  not-are necessarily in time: for there is a greater time which will

  extend both beyond their existence and beyond the time which

  measures their existence. Of things which do not exist but are

  contained by time some were, e.g. Homer once was, some will be, e.g. a

  future event; this depends on the direction in which time contains

  them; if on both, they have both modes of existence. As to such things

  as it does not contain in any way, they neither were nor are nor

  will be. These are those nonexistents whose opposites always are, as

  the incommensurability of the diagonal always is-and this will not

  be in time. Nor will the commensurability, therefore; hence this

  eternally is not, because it is contrary to what eternally is. A thing

  whose contrary is not eternal can be and not be, and it is of such

  things that there is coming to be and passing away.

  13

  The 'now' is the link of time, as has been said (for it connects

  past and future time), and it is a limit of time (for it is the

  beginning of the one and the end of the other). But this is not

  obvious as it is with the point, which is fixed. It divides

  potentially, and in so far as it is dividing the 'now' is always

  different, but in so far as it connects it is always the same, as it

  is with mathematical lines. For the intellect it is not always one and

  the same point, since it is other and other when one divides the line;

  but in so far as it is one, it is the same in every respect.

  So the 'now' also is in one way a potential dividing of time, in

  another the termination of both parts, and their unity. And the

  dividing and the uniting are the same thing and in the same reference,

  but in essence they are not the same.

  So one kind of 'now' is described in this way: another is when the

  time is near this kind of 'now'. 'He will come now' because he will

  come to-day; 'he has come now' because he came to-day. But the

  things in the Iliad have not happened 'now', nor is the flood

  'now'-not that the time from now to them is not continuous, but

  because they are not near.

  'At some time' means a time determined in relation to the first of

  the two types of 'now', e.g. 'at some time' Troy was taken, and 'at

  some time' there will be a flood; for it must be determined with

  reference to the 'now'. There will thus be a determinate time from

  this 'now' to that, and there was such in reference to the past event.

  But if there be no time which is not 'sometime', every time will be

  determined.

  Will time then fail? Surely not, if motion always exists. Is time

  then always different or does the same time recur? Clearly time is, in

  the same way as motion is. For if one and the same motion sometimes

  recurs, it will be one and the same time, and if not, not.

  Since the 'now' is an end and a beginning of time, not of the same

  time however, but the end of that which is past and the beginning of

  that which is to come, it follows that, as the circle has its

  convexity and its concavity, in a sense, in the same thing, so time is

  always at a beginning and at an end. And for this reason it seems to

  be always different; for the 'now' is not the beginning and the end of

  the same thing; if it were, it would be at the same time and in the

  same respect two opposites. And time will not fail; for it is always

  at a beginning.

  'Presently' or 'just' refers to the part of future time which is

  near the indivisible present 'now' ('When do you walk? 'Presently',

  because the time in which he is going to do so is near), and to the

  part of past time which is not far from the 'now' ('When do you walk?'

  'I have just been walking'). But to say that Troy has just been

  taken-we do not say that, because it is too far from the 'now'.

  'Lately', too, refers to the part of past time which is near the

  present 'now'. 'When did you go?' 'Lately', if the time is near the

  existing now. 'Long ago' refers to the distant past.

  'Suddenly' refers to what has departed from its former condition

  in a time imperceptible because of its smallness; but it is the nature

  of all change to alter things from their former condition. In time all

  things come into being and pass away; for which reason some called

  it the wisest of all things, but the Pythagorean Pa
ron called it the

  most stupid, because in it we also forget; and his was the truer view.

  It is clear then that it must be in itself, as we said before, the

  condition of destruction rather than of coming into being (for change,

  in itself, makes things depart from their former condition), and

  only incidentally of coming into being, and of being. A sufficient

  evidence of this is that nothing comes into being without itself

  moving somehow and acting, but a thing can be destroyed even if it

  does not move at all. And this is what, as a rule, we chiefly mean

  by a thing's being destroyed by time. Still, time does not work even

  this change; even this sort of change takes place incidentally in

  time.

  We have stated, then, that time exists and what it is, and in how

  many senses we speak of the 'now', and what 'at some time',

  'lately', 'presently' or 'just', 'long ago', and 'suddenly' mean.

  14

  These distinctions having been drawn, it is evident that every

  change and everything that moves is in time; for the distinction of

  faster and slower exists in reference to all change, since it is found

  in every instance. In the phrase 'moving faster' I refer to that which

  changes before another into the condition in question, when it moves

  over the same interval and with a regular movement; e.g. in the case

  of locomotion, if both things move along the circumference of a

  circle, or both along a straight line; and similarly in all other

  cases. But what is before is in time; for we say 'before' and

  'after' with reference to the distance from the 'now', and the 'now'

  is the boundary of the past and the future; so that since 'nows' are

  in time, the before and the after will be in time too; for in that

  in which the 'now' is, the distance from the 'now' will also be. But

  'before' is used contrariwise with reference to past and to future

  time; for in the past we call 'before' what is farther from the 'now',